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 INTRODUCTION  
 The argument used by Socrates to refute the thesis that piety is what all the gods 
love is one of the most well known in the history of philosophy. Yet some fundamental 
points of interpretation have gone unnoticed. I will show that (i) the strategy of Socrates’ 
argument refutes not only Euthyphro’s theory of piety and such neighboring doctrines as 
cultural relativism and subjectivism, but nominalism in general; moreover, that (ii) the 
argument needs to assume much less than is generally thought, and finally that (iii) while 
Socrates’ argument, properly understood in its full force, appears to be inconsistent with 
the goal of his own inquiry, his own ‘Platonic’ position escapes the inconsistency. 
 Socrates questions Euthyphro about the nature of piety, looking for a definition 
that will tell him what makes an action or person pious. He refutes a number of 
definitions of piety suggested by Euthyphro. Of special interest is Euthyphro’s definition: 
 
(D1) The pious = whatever all the gods love. 
 
That such a definition can be refuted is intriguing to philosophers. But, beyond our 
interest in the nature of piety, Socrates’ refutation, as is sometimes noticed, extends to a 
whole class of similar definitions, including this monotheistic definition of piety: 
 
(D2) The pious = whatever God loves, 
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and also the cultural relativist’s definition of justice: 
 
(D3) Justice = whatever a society approves, 
 
and, as well, the subjectivist’s definition of morality: 
 
(D4) Morality = whatever the individual chooses. 
 
 NOMINALISM ALSO REFUTED  
 What has not been noticed is that the class of definitions refuted by Socrates’ 
strategy is the entire class of nominalist definitions of this form: for any property, 
signifier, and mode of signification, 
 
(NM) The property = whatever the signifier signifies as such. 
 
Written in the form of NM, referring as it does to ‘the property’, the nominalist’s 
characteristic refusal to admit the existence of abstract objects is not obvious. But it is 
also characteristic of nominalism “to regard abstractions as fictions or manners of 
speaking.” The nominalist hopes “to find a method whereby all ostensible reference to 
abstract entities can be explained as mere shorthand for a more basic idiom involving 
reference only to concrete objects (in some sense or other)” (both quotes from Quine, 
1951:121). The formula NM in effect provides such a method, for it identifies properties 
solely in terms of particular spatio-temporal objects. Moreover, NM enables the 
nominalist to resist the Platonic one-over-many inference, an inference made explicit at 
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Parmenides 131e-132a (“I imagine your ground for believing in a single form in each 
case is this. When it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems, I 
suppose, to be a certain single character which is the same when you look at them all; 
hence you think that largeness is a single thing), but anticipated at Euthyphro 6d (“There 
is one ideal form . . . by which all holy things are holy”). The nominalist method NM 
allows us to speak of many pious (or, in general, P) things and at the same time allows us 
to explain why they are all called such: not in virtue of one pious abstract object shared 
by the many pious things, but rather in virtue of concrete acts of signification. (There are 
other problems with this nominalist strategy, but I leave them aside here. See Penner, 
1987:20-24.) Once we see that Euthyphro’s definition encompasses a powerful 
nominalist method, Socrates’ argument takes on even greater range of impact than has 
been noticed. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT’S ASSUMPTION 
 There is no controversy among interpreters (see e.g. Jowett, 1893; Friedländer, 
1964; Irwin, 1979) that Socrates’ argument requires only one premise: 
 
(P1) The gods love something because it is pious; it is not the case that something is 
pious because it is loved by the gods (Euthyph. 10d).1 
 
Notice that premise P1 sees the gods as like lawyers: they have knowledge of what the 
“laws” or standards of piety are, and can advise or approve accordingly. But they are 
                                                
1 There has been controversy over the interpretation of the examples by which Socrates establishes 
P1. The locus classicus is Geach, 1968, but see also Brown, 1964; Rose, 1965; and Hall, 1968. Those 
interpretive problems were largely settled by Cohen, 1971.  
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unable to change the law according to their pleasure or “love.” It was a feature of the 
traditional religion of the time to see the gods as subjects to fate and necessity; hence it 
was natural for Euthyphro to accept P1. 
 Given P1, here is how the refutation works.2 Euthyphro’s definition D1 is an 
identity statement; hence it licenses us to substitute expressions of the form ‘the gods 
love X’ and ‘X is pious’ one for the other. When we make these substitutions in P1, the 
result is: 
 
(P2) Something is pious because the gods love it; it is not the case that the gods love 
something because it is pious. 
 
But P2 is in direct contradiction to P1! Indeed, it doubly contradicts it: the first clause of 
P2 contradicts the second clause of P1, and the second clause of P2 contradicts the first 
clause of P1. Since Euthyphro’s definition D1 leads to contradictions (upon our accepting 
premise P1), it is refuted. 
 But what if we do not accept premise P1? It is standard for interpreters to think 
that a consistent Euthyphro could escape the argument by denying P1 (see e.g. Allen, 
1970, and Guthrie, 1975). Rather than see the gods as like perfectly knowledgeable 
lawyers, we might see them as like perfectly absolute monarchs. Just as an absolute 
monarch’s will determines what becomes law, we might see the gods’ love as 
determining what is pious. This view of God or the gods is a position taken often enough 
in the history of philosophy to have a name: theological voluntarism. Hence Euthyphro, 
by denying premise P1, might appear to escape Socrates’ argument. 
                                                
2  I simplify the structure of the argument. For an accurate account of the details, see Kim 2004. 
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 Looked at more generally, we might expect that perhaps some nominalists will 
admit that their view of properties gets cause and effect backwards, and accordingly 
abandon their nominalism. But, even today, we can find nominalists who insist they have 
the correct view of cause and effect: such are ‘social constructivists’ and perhaps even 
‘post-moderns’ in general. In modern times, this revision of the order of cause and effect 
follows Kant’s celebrated “Copernican revolution” (in the Preface to the second edition 
of his Critique of Pure Reason). Such views will also deny versions of P1 and escape the 
Socratic argument. 
 But, although I know of no interpreter who sees that the argument does not need 
so strong an assumption as P1, neither the theological voluntarist nor the nominalist in 
general can so easily escape Socrates’ argument. Consider first the theological 
voluntarist. According to that doctrine, the gods’ love determines what is pious. That is, 
something is pious because the gods love it; it is not the case that the gods love 
something because it is pious. This statement, of course, is exactly what premise P2 says. 
But once again the proposed definition D1 licenses us to substitute expressions of the 
form ‘the gods love X’ and ‘X is pious’ one for the other. Now when we make these 
substitutions in P2, the result is P1, and once more we get a (double) contradiction. 
Obviously, this problem generalizes to nominalism in general. 
 
 THE THREAT OF INCONSISTENCY 
 Socrates’ argument depends on the fact that the following form of definition D 
and premise P are inconsistent: 
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(D) The pious = being X. 
(P) (a) Something is pious because it is X; (b) it is not the case that it is X because it is 
pious. 
 
The threat is that the inconsistency between D and P will infect Socrates’ own inquiry. 
For the goal of his inquiry is to find the definition of piety, namely, in his words, “the 
characteristic that makes something holy” (6d10-11). Call this characteristic, whatever it 
is, being X. Then, by Socrates’ own account, being X is what makes something holy. That 
is -- just as in the first clause a of P above -- something is holy because it is X. And 
Socrates appears to accept the second clause b of P as well, taking it as a corollary of the 
first clause (cf.10c). If so, then he appears as guilty of inconsistency as Euthyphro or, in 
general, nominalists of any sort.  
 My claim is that Socrates’ Platonism -- if you allow the anachronism -- will avoid 
the contradiction. For Socrates, unlike nominalists of whatever species, distinguishes at 
Euthyphro 6de between the one pious itself, i.e. the form and the many pious things, i.e. 
particular actions and persons. And he emphasizes the non-identity of this sort of cause 
and effect (“you understand how in all such cases the things are different from each other 
[hetera allēlōn] and how they are different?” 10a7-8). We ought not identify form and 
particulars, once we have drawn this distinction. Hence one may not be substituted for the 
other. The one pious itself, referred to in D, is the cause of the particular pious thing 
(referred to in P) being pious. So the substitution cannot be made.  
 Aristotle (Met. 1.6) suggests that while Socrates looked for universals, it was left 
to Plato to make (what Aristotle considers) the mistake of separating the universal from 
the particular. My interest here is not in the speculative matter of identifying Socratic as 
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opposed to Platonic dialogues. Nonetheless, if we assume, as is standardly done, that the 
Euthyphro is ‘Socratic’ as opposed to ‘Platonic’, then, I have shown, Socrates in a way 
separated the universal. 
 A final question arises: is Socrates playing fair with Euthyphro? It might seem 
that Socrates’ refutation is a mere trick, a sophism, which Socrates gets away with only 
because Euthyphro does not detect it. Euthyphro himself, it must be remembered, agreed 
to the Socratic distinction between one form and many particulars. So for Socrates to 
insert into Euthyphro’s account a contradiction, which Euthyphro as well as Socrates can 
avoid, seems a nasty trick. 
 But, as we have seen, Euthyphro’s definition of piety as what the gods all love is 
essentially nominalist (just as cultural relativism and subjectivism are). And the 
nominalist doctrine, by its very nature, is incapable of the distinction needed to avoid 
refutation. According to this doctrine of piety, there is no inherent feature that makes 
something pious. Piety is conferred on the particular by a particular pronunciation of a 
name, act of choice or approval. So the contradiction is not the result of an easily 
corrected oversight; it goes to the very heart of Euthyphro’s definition. 
 
George Rudebusch 
Department of Philosophy 
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